Abstract:This paper explores ideas and provides a potential roadmap for the development and evaluation of physics-specific large-scale AI models, which we call Large Physics Models (LPMs). These models, based on foundation models such as Large Language Models (LLMs) - trained on broad data - are tailored to address the demands of physics research. LPMs can function independently or as part of an integrated framework. This framework can incorporate specialized tools, including symbolic reasoning modules for mathematical manipulations, frameworks to analyse specific experimental and simulated data, and mechanisms for synthesizing theories and scientific literature. We begin by examining whether the physics community should actively develop and refine dedicated models, rather than relying solely on commercial LLMs. We then outline how LPMs can be realized through interdisciplinary collaboration among experts in physics, computer science, and philosophy of science. To integrate these models effectively, we identify three key pillars: Development, Evaluation, and Philosophical Reflection. Development focuses on constructing models capable of processing physics texts, mathematical formulations, and diverse physical data. Evaluation assesses accuracy and reliability by testing and benchmarking. Finally, Philosophical Reflection encompasses the analysis of broader implications of LLMs in physics, including their potential to generate new scientific understanding and what novel collaboration dynamics might arise in research. Inspired by the organizational structure of experimental collaborations in particle physics, we propose a similarly interdisciplinary and collaborative approach to building and refining Large Physics Models. This roadmap provides specific objectives, defines pathways to achieve them, and identifies challenges that must be addressed to realise physics-specific large scale AI models.
Abstract:Explainable AI (xAI) methods are important for establishing trust in using black-box models. However, recent criticism has mounted against current xAI methods that they disagree, are necessarily false, and can be manipulated, which has started to undermine the deployment of black-box models. Rudin (2019) goes so far as to say that we should stop using black-box models altogether in high-stakes cases because xAI explanations "must be wrong". However, strict fidelity to the truth is historically not a desideratum in science. Idealizations -- the intentional distortions introduced to scientific theories and models -- are commonplace in the natural sciences and are seen as a successful scientific tool. Thus, it is not falsehood qua falsehood that is the issue. In this paper, I outline the need for xAI research to engage in idealization evaluation. Drawing on the use of idealizations in the natural sciences and philosophy of science, I introduce a novel framework for evaluating whether xAI methods engage in successful idealizations or deceptive explanations (SIDEs). SIDEs evaluates whether the limitations of xAI methods, and the distortions that they introduce, can be part of a successful idealization or are indeed deceptive distortions as critics suggest. I discuss the role that existing research can play in idealization evaluation and where innovation is necessary. Through a qualitative analysis we find that leading feature importance methods and counterfactual explanations are subject to idealization failure and suggest remedies for ameliorating idealization failure.