Counterfactual Maps: What They Are and How to Find Them

Counterfactual explanations are a central tool in interpretable machine learning, yet computing them exactly for complex models remains challenging. For tree ensembles, predictions are piecewise constant over a large collection of axis-aligned hyperrectangles, implying that an optimal counterfactual for a point corresponds to its projection onto the nearest rectangle with an alternative label under a chosen metric. Existing methods largely overlook this geometric structure, relying either on heuristics with no optimality guarantees or on mixed-integer programming formulations that do not scale to interactive use. In this work, we revisit counterfactual generation through the lens of nearest-region search and introduce counterfactual maps, a global representation of recourse for tree ensembles. Leveraging the fact that any tree ensemble can be compressed into an equivalent partition of labeled hyperrectangles, we cast counterfactual search as the problem of identifying the generalized Voronoi cell associated with the nearest rectangle of an alternative label. This leads to an exact, amortized algorithm based on volumetric k-dimensional (KD) trees, which performs branch-and-bound nearest-region queries with explicit optimality certificates and sublinear average query time after a one-time preprocessing phase. Our experimental analyses on several real datasets drawn from high-stakes application domains show that this approach delivers globally optimal counterfactual explanations with millisecond-level latency, achieving query times that are orders of magnitude faster than existing exact, cold-start optimization methods.

From Counterfactuals to Trees: Competitive Analysis of Model Extraction Attacks

The advent of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has heightened the trade-off between model explainability and security. In particular, explainability techniques, such as counterfactual explanations, inadvertently increase the risk of model extraction attacks, enabling unauthorized replication of proprietary models. In this paper, we formalize and characterize the risks and inherent complexity of model reconstruction, focusing on the "oracle'' queries required for faithfully inferring the underlying prediction function. We present the first formal analysis of model extraction attacks through the lens of competitive analysis, establishing a foundational framework to evaluate their efficiency. Focusing on models based on additive decision trees (e.g., decision trees, gradient boosting, and random forests), we introduce novel reconstruction algorithms that achieve provably perfect fidelity while demonstrating strong anytime performance. Our framework provides theoretical bounds on the query complexity for extracting tree-based model, offering new insights into the security vulnerabilities of their deployment.