Reza
Abstract:The surge in demand for efficient radio resource management has necessitated the development of sophisticated yet compact neural network architectures. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) tailored for radio resource management by presenting a new architecture: the Low Rank Message Passing Graph Neural Network (LR-MPGNN). The cornerstone of LR-MPGNN is the implementation of a low-rank approximation technique that substitutes the conventional linear layers with their low-rank counterparts. This innovative design significantly reduces the model size and the number of parameters. We evaluate the performance of the proposed LR-MPGNN model based on several key metrics: model size, number of parameters, weighted sum rate of the communication system, and the distribution of eigenvalues of weight matrices. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate that the LR-MPGNN model achieves a sixtyfold decrease in model size, and the number of model parameters can be reduced by up to 98%. Performance-wise, the LR-MPGNN demonstrates robustness with a marginal 2% reduction in the best-case scenario in the normalized weighted sum rate compared to the original MPGNN model. Additionally, the distribution of eigenvalues of the weight matrices in the LR-MPGNN model is more uniform and spans a wider range, suggesting a strategic redistribution of weights.
Abstract:This paper introduces adversarial attacks targeting a Graph Neural Network (GNN) based radio resource management system in point to point (P2P) communications. Our focus lies on perturbing the trained GNN model during the test phase, specifically targeting its vertices and edges. To achieve this, four distinct adversarial attacks are proposed, each accounting for different constraints, and aiming to manipulate the behavior of the system. The proposed adversarial attacks are formulated as optimization problems, aiming to minimize the system's communication quality. The efficacy of these attacks is investigated against the number of users, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and adversary power budget. Furthermore, we address the detection of such attacks from the perspective of the Central Processing Unit (CPU) of the system. To this end, we formulate an optimization problem that involves analyzing the distribution of channel eigenvalues before and after the attacks are applied. This formulation results in a Min-Max optimization problem, allowing us to detect the presence of attacks. Through extensive simulations, we observe that in the absence of adversarial attacks, the eigenvalues conform to Johnson's SU distribution. However, the attacks significantly alter the characteristics of the eigenvalue distribution, and in the most effective attack, they even change the type of the eigenvalue distribution.