The Fair Value of Data Under Heterogeneous Privacy Constraints

Modern data aggregation often takes the form of a platform collecting data from a network of users. More than ever, these users are now requesting that the data they provide is protected with a guarantee of privacy. This has led to the study of optimal data acquisition frameworks, where the optimality criterion is typically the maximization of utility for the agent trying to acquire the data. This involves determining how to allocate payments to users for the purchase of their data at various privacy levels. The main goal of this paper is to characterize a fair amount to pay users for their data at a given privacy level. We propose an axiomatic definition of fairness, analogous to the celebrated Shapley value. Two concepts for fairness are introduced. The first treats the platform and users as members of a common coalition and provides a complete description of how to divide the utility among the platform and users. In the second concept, fairness is defined only among users, leading to a potential fairness-constrained mechanism design problem for the platform. We consider explicit examples involving private heterogeneous data and show how these notions of fairness can be applied. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first fairness concepts for data that explicitly consider privacy constraints.