Preserving Smart Grid Integrity: A Differential Privacy Framework for Secure Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in the Smart Grid

In this paper, we present a framework based on differential privacy (DP) for querying electric power measurements to detect system anomalies or bad data caused by false data injections (FDIs). Our DP approach conceals consumption and system matrix data, while simultaneously enabling an untrusted third party to test hypotheses of anomalies, such as an FDI attack, by releasing a randomized sufficient statistic for hypothesis-testing. We consider a measurement model corrupted by Gaussian noise and a sparse noise vector representing the attack, and we observe that the optimal test statistic is a chi-square random variable. To detect possible attacks, we propose a novel DP chi-square noise mechanism that ensures the test does not reveal private information about power injections or the system matrix. The proposed framework provides a robust solution for detecting FDIs while preserving the privacy of sensitive power system data.