Abstract:AI Impact Assessments are only as good as the measures used to assess the impact of these systems. It is therefore paramount that we can justify our choice of metrics in these assessments, especially for difficult to quantify ethical and social values. We present a two-step approach to ensure metrics are properly motivated. First, a conception needs to be spelled out (e.g. Rawlsian fairness or fairness as solidarity) and then a metric can be fitted to that conception. Both steps require separate justifications, as conceptions can be judged on how well they fit with the function of, for example, fairness. We argue that conceptual engineering offers helpful tools for this step. Second, metrics need to be fitted to a conception. We illustrate this process through an examination of competing fairness metrics to illustrate that here the additional content that a conception offers helps us justify the choice for a specific metric. We thus advocate that impact assessments are not only clear on their metrics, but also on the conceptions that motivate those metrics.
Abstract:In order to monitor and prevent bias in AI systems we can use a wide range of (statistical) fairness measures. However, it is mathematically impossible to optimize for all of these measures at the same time. In addition, optimizing a fairness measure often greatly reduces the accuracy of the system (Kozodoi et al, 2022). As a result, we need a substantive theory that informs us how to make these decisions and for what reasons. I show that by using Rawls' notion of justice as fairness, we can create a basis for navigating fairness measures and the accuracy trade-off. In particular, this leads to a principled choice focusing on both the most vulnerable groups and the type of fairness measure that has the biggest impact on that group. This also helps to close part of the gap between philosophical accounts of distributive justice and the fairness literature that has been observed (Kuppler et al, 2021) and to operationalise the value of fairness.