On the Semantics of Primary Cause in Hybrid Dynamic Domains

Reasoning about actual causes of observed effects is fundamental to the study of rationality. This important problem has been studied since the time of Aristotle, with formal mathematical accounts emerging recently. We live in a world where change due to actions can be both discrete and continuous, that is, hybrid. Yet, despite extensive research on actual causation, only few recent studies looked into causation with continuous change. Building on recent progress, in this paper we propose two definitions of primary cause in a hybrid action-theoretic framework, namely the hybrid temporal situation calculus. One of these is foundational in nature while the other formalizes causation through contributions, which can then be verified from a counterfactual perspective using a modified ``but-for'' test. We prove that these two definitions are indeed equivalent. We then show that our definitions of causation have some intuitively justifiable properties.

Reasoning about Actual Causes in Nondeterministic Domains -- Extended Version

Reasoning about the causes behind observations is crucial to the formalization of rationality. While extensive research has been conducted on root cause analysis, most studies have predominantly focused on deterministic settings. In this paper, we investigate causation in more realistic nondeterministic domains, where the agent does not have any control on and may not know the choices that are made by the environment. We build on recent preliminary work on actual causation in the nondeterministic situation calculus to formalize more sophisticated forms of reasoning about actual causes in such domains. We investigate the notions of ``Certainly Causes'' and ``Possibly Causes'' that enable the representation of actual cause for agent actions in these domains. We then show how regression in the situation calculus can be extended to reason about such notions of actual causes.

Behaviour Explanation via Causal Analysis of Mental States: A Preliminary Report

Inspired by a novel action-theoretic formalization of actual cause, Khan and Lesp\'erance (2021) recently proposed a first account of causal knowledge that supports epistemic effects, models causal knowledge dynamics, and allows sensing actions to be causes of observed effects. To date, no other study has looked specifically at these issues. But their formalization is not sufficiently expressive enough to model explanations via causal analysis of mental states as it ignores a crucial aspect of theory of mind, namely motivations. In this paper, we build on their work to support causal reasoning about conative effects. In our framework, one can reason about causes of motivational states, and we allow motivation-altering actions to be causes of observed effects. We illustrate that this formalization along with a model of goal recognition can be utilized to explain agent behaviour in communicative multiagent contexts.

Towards A Logical Account of Epistemic Causality

Reasoning about observed effects and their causes is important in multi-agent contexts. While there has been much work on causality from an objective standpoint, causality from the point of view of some particular agent has received much less attention. In this paper, we address this issue by incorporating an epistemic dimension to an existing formal model of causality. We define what it means for an agent to know the causes of an effect. Then using a counterexample, we prove that epistemic causality is a different notion from its objective counterpart.