Proportional Fairness in Clustering: A Social Choice Perspective

We study the proportional clustering problem of Chen et al. [ICML'19] and relate it to the area of multiwinner voting in computational social choice. We show that any clustering satisfying a weak proportionality notion of Brill and Peters [EC'23] simultaneously obtains the best known approximations to the proportional fairness notion of Chen et al. [ICML'19], but also to individual fairness [Jung et al., FORC'20] and the "core" [Li et al. ICML'21]. In fact, we show that any approximation to proportional fairness is also an approximation to individual fairness and vice versa. Finally, we also study stronger notions of proportional representation, in which deviations do not only happen to single, but multiple candidate centers, and show that stronger proportionality notions of Brill and Peters [EC'23] imply approximations to these stronger guarantees.

Modification-Fair Cluster Editing

The classic Cluster Editing problem (also known as Correlation Clustering) asks to transform a given graph into a disjoint union of cliques (clusters) by a small number of edge modifications. When applied to vertex-colored graphs (the colors representing subgroups), standard algorithms for the NP-hard Cluster Editing problem may yield solutions that are biased towards subgroups of data (e.g., demographic groups), measured in the number of modifications incident to the members of the subgroups. We propose a modification fairness constraint which ensures that the number of edits incident to each subgroup is proportional to its size. To start with, we study Modification-Fair Cluster Editing for graphs with two vertex colors. We show that the problem is NP-hard even if one may only insert edges within a subgroup; note that in the classic "non-fair" setting, this case is trivially polynomial-time solvable. However, in the more general editing form, the modification-fair variant remains fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number of edge edits. We complement these and further theoretical results with an empirical analysis of our model on real-world social networks where we find that the price of modification-fairness is surprisingly low, that is, the cost of optimal modification-fair differs from the cost of optimal "non-fair" solutions only by a small percentage.