Simulated Reasoning is Reasoning

Reasoning has long been understood as a pathway between stages of understanding. Proper reasoning leads to understanding of a given subject. This reasoning was conceptualized as a process of understanding in a particular way, i.e., "symbolic reasoning". Foundational Models (FM) demonstrate that this is not a necessary condition for many reasoning tasks: they can "reason" by way of imitating the process of "thinking out loud", testing the produced pathways, and iterating on these pathways on their own. This leads to some form of reasoning that can solve problems on its own or with few-shot learning, but appears fundamentally different from human reasoning due to its lack of grounding and common sense, leading to brittleness of the reasoning process. These insights promise to substantially alter our assessment of reasoning and its necessary conditions, but also inform the approaches to safety and robust defences against this brittleness of FMs. This paper offers and discusses several philosophical interpretations of this phenomenon, argues that the previously apt metaphor of the "stochastic parrot" has lost its relevance and thus should be abandoned, and reflects on different normative elements in the safety- and appropriateness-considerations emerging from these reasoning models and their growing capacity.

Appropriateness is all you need!

The strive to make AI applications "safe" has led to the development of safety-measures as the main or even sole normative requirement of their permissible use. Similar can be attested to the latest version of chatbots, such as chatGPT. In this view, if they are "safe", they are supposed to be permissible to deploy. This approach, which we call "safety-normativity", is rather limited in solving the emerging issues that chatGPT and other chatbots have caused thus far. In answering this limitation, in this paper we argue for limiting chatbots in the range of topics they can chat about according to the normative concept of appropriateness. We argue that rather than looking for "safety" in a chatbot's utterances to determine what they may and may not say, we ought to assess those utterances according to three forms of appropriateness: technical-discursive, social, and moral. We then spell out what requirements for chatbots follow from these forms of appropriateness to avoid the limits of previous accounts: positionality, acceptability, and value alignment (PAVA). With these in mind, we may be able to determine what a chatbot may and may not say. Lastly, one initial suggestion is to use challenge sets, specifically designed for appropriateness, as a validation method.