Abstract:Weighted voting games is one of the most important classes of cooperative games. Recently, Zhang and Grossi [53] proposed a variant of this class, called delegative simple games, which is well suited to analyse the relative importance of each voter in liquid democracy elections. Moreover, they defined a power index, called the delagative Banzhaf index to compute the importance of each agent (i.e., both voters and delegators) in a delegation graph based on two key parameters: the total voting weight she has accumulated and the structure of supports she receives from her delegators. We obtain several results related to delegative simple games. We first propose a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute the delegative Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik values in delegative simple games. We then investigate a bribery problem where the goal is to maximize/minimize the voting power/weight of a given voter in a delegation graph by changing at most a fixed number of delegations. We show that the problems of minimizing/maximizing a voter's power index value are strongly NP-hard. Furthermore, we prove that having a better approximation guarantee than $1-1/e$ to maximize the voting weight of a voter is not possible, unless $P = NP$, then we provide some parameterized complexity results for this problem. Finally, we show that finding a delegation graph with a given number of gurus that maximizes the minimum power index value an agent can have is a computationally hard problem.
Abstract:In this paper, we investigate the so-called ODP-problem that has been formulated by Caragiannis and Micha [10]. Here, we are in a setting with two election alternatives out of which one is assumed to be correct. In ODP, the goal is to organise the delegations in the social network in order to maximize the probability that the correct alternative, referred to as ground truth, is elected. While the problem is known to be computationally hard, we strengthen existing hardness results by providing a novel strong approximation hardness result: For any positive constant $C$, we prove that, unless $P=NP$, there is no polynomial-time algorithm for ODP that achieves an approximation guarantee of $\alpha \ge (\ln n)^{-C}$, where $n$ is the number of voters. The reduction designed for this result uses poorly connected social networks in which some voters suffer from misinformation. Interestingly, under some hypothesis on either the accuracies of voters or the connectivity of the network, we obtain a polynomial-time $1/2$-approximation algorithm. This observation proves formally that the connectivity of the social network is a key feature for the efficiency of the liquid democracy paradigm. Lastly, we run extensive simulations and observe that simple algorithms (working either in a centralized or decentralized way) outperform direct democracy on a large class of instances. Overall, our contributions yield new insights on the question in which situations liquid democracy can be beneficial.
Abstract:In the influence maximization (IM) problem, we are given a social network and a budget $k$, and we look for a set of $k$ nodes in the network, called seeds, that maximize the expected number of nodes that are reached by an influence cascade generated by the seeds, according to some stochastic model for influence diffusion. In this paper, we study the adaptive IM, where the nodes are selected sequentially one by one, and the decision on the $i$th seed can be based on the observed cascade produced by the first $i-1$ seeds. We focus on the full-adoption feedback in which we can observe the entire cascade of each previously selected seed and on the independent cascade model where each edge is associated with an independent probability of diffusing influence. Our main result is the first sub-linear upper bound that holds for any graph. Specifically, we show that the adaptivity gap is upper-bounded by $\lceil n^{1/3}\rceil $, where $n$ is the number of nodes in the graph. Moreover, we improve over the known upper bound for in-arborescences from $\frac{2e}{e-1}\approx 3.16$ to $\frac{2e^2}{e^2-1}\approx 2.31$. Finally, we study $\alpha$-bounded graphs, a class of undirected graphs in which the sum of node degrees higher than two is at most $\alpha$, and show that the adaptivity gap is upper-bounded by $\sqrt{\alpha}+O(1)$. Moreover, we show that in 0-bounded graphs, i.e. undirected graphs in which each connected component is a path or a cycle, the adaptivity gap is at most $\frac{3e^3}{e^3-1}\approx 3.16$. To prove our bounds, we introduce new techniques to relate adaptive policies with non-adaptive ones that might be of their own interest.