Abstract:To what extent can LLMs be used as part of a cognitive model of language generation? In this paper, we approach this question by exploring a neuro-symbolic implementation of an algorithmic cognitive model of referential expression generation by Dale & Reiter (1995). The symbolic task analysis implements the generation as an iterative procedure that scaffolds symbolic and gpt-3.5-turbo-based modules. We compare this implementation to an ablated model and a one-shot LLM-only baseline on the A3DS dataset (Tsvilodub & Franke, 2023). We find that our hybrid approach is cognitively plausible and performs well in complex contexts, while allowing for more open-ended modeling of language generation in a larger domain.
Abstract:State of the art large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance on a variety of benchmark tasks and are increasingly used as components in larger applications, where LLM-based predictions serve as proxies for human judgements or decision. This raises questions about the human-likeness of LLM-derived information, alignment with human intuition, and whether LLMs could possibly be considered (parts of) explanatory models of (aspects of) human cognition or language use. To shed more light on these issues, we here investigate the human-likeness of LLMs' predictions for multiple-choice decision tasks from the perspective of Bayesian statistical modeling. Using human data from a forced-choice experiment on pragmatic language use, we find that LLMs do not capture the variance in the human data at the item-level. We suggest different ways of deriving full distributional predictions from LLMs for aggregate, condition-level data, and find that some, but not all ways of obtaining condition-level predictions yield adequate fits to human data. These results suggests that assessment of LLM performance depends strongly on seemingly subtle choices in methodology, and that LLMs are at best predictors of human behavior at the aggregate, condition-level, for which they are, however, not designed to, or usually used to, make predictions in the first place.