Abstract:Veterinary electronic health records (vEHRs) contain privacy-sensitive identifiers that limit secondary use. While PetEVAL provides a benchmark for veterinary de-identification, the domain remains low-resource. This study evaluates whether large language model (LLM)-generated synthetic narratives improve de-identification safety under distinct training regimes, emphasizing (i) synthetic augmentation and (ii) fixed-budget substitution. We conducted a controlled simulation using a PetEVAL-derived corpus (3,750 holdout/1,249 train). We generated 10,382 synthetic notes using a privacy-preserving "template-only" regime where identifiers were removed prior to LLM prompting. Three transformer backbones (PetBERT, VetBERT, Bio_ClinicalBERT) were trained under varying mixtures. Evaluation prioritized document-level leakage rate (the fraction of documents with at least one missed identifier) as the primary safety outcome. Results show that under fixed-sample substitution, replacing real notes with synthetic ones monotonically increased leakage, indicating synthetic data cannot safely replace real supervision. Under compute-matched training, moderate synthetic mixing matched real-only performance, but high synthetic dominance degraded utility. Conversely, epoch-scaled augmentation improved performance: PetBERT span-overlap F1 increased from 0.831 to 0.850 +/- 0.014, and leakage decreased from 6.32% to 4.02% +/- 0.19%. However, these gains largely reflect increased training exposure rather than intrinsic synthetic data quality. Corpus diagnostics revealed systematic synthetic-real mismatches in note length and label distribution that align with persistent leakage. We conclude that synthetic augmentation is effective for expanding exposure but is complementary, not substitutive, for safety-critical veterinary de-identification.
Abstract:This report addresses the technical aspects of de-identification of medical images of human subjects and biospecimens, such that re-identification risk of ethical, moral, and legal concern is sufficiently reduced to allow unrestricted public sharing for any purpose, regardless of the jurisdiction of the source and distribution sites. All medical images, regardless of the mode of acquisition, are considered, though the primary emphasis is on those with accompanying data elements, especially those encoded in formats in which the data elements are embedded, particularly Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM). These images include image-like objects such as Segmentations, Parametric Maps, and Radiotherapy (RT) Dose objects. The scope also includes related non-image objects, such as RT Structure Sets, Plans and Dose Volume Histograms, Structured Reports, and Presentation States. Only de-identification of publicly released data is considered, and alternative approaches to privacy preservation, such as federated learning for artificial intelligence (AI) model development, are out of scope, as are issues of privacy leakage from AI model sharing. Only technical issues of public sharing are addressed.