Abstract:We present a novel Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) system using open-vocabulary object detection and classification models. A primary advantage of this approach is that target classes can be defined just before runtime by a non-technical end user, using either a few natural language text descriptions of the target, or a few image exemplars, or both. Nuances in the desired targets can be expressed in natural language, which is useful for unique targets with little or no training data. We also implemented a novel combination of several techniques to improve performance, such as leveraging the additional information in the sequence of overlapping frames to perform tubelet identification (i.e., sequential bounding box matching), bounding box re-scoring, and tubelet linking. Additionally, we developed a technique to visualize the aggregate output of many overlapping frames as a mosaic of the area scanned during the aerial surveillance or reconnaissance, and a kernel density estimate (or heatmap) of the detected targets. We initially applied this ATR system to the use case of detecting and clearing unexploded ordinance on airfield runways and we are currently extending our research to other real-world applications.
Abstract:Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) generate valuable knowledge about network security, but an abundance of false alarms and a lack of methods to capture the interdependence among alerts hampers their utility for network defense. Here, we explore a graph-based approach for fusing alerts generated by multiple IDSs (e.g., Snort, OSSEC, and Bro). Our approach generates a weighted graph of alert fields (not network topology) that makes explicit the connections between multiple alerts, IDS systems, and other cyber artifacts. We use this multi-modal graph to identify anomalous changes in the alert patterns of a network. To detect the anomalies, we apply the role-dynamics approach, which has successfully identified anomalies in social media, email, and IP communication graphs. In the cyber domain, each node (alert field) in the fused IDS alert graph is assigned a probability distribution across a small set of roles based on that node's features. A cyber attack should trigger IDS alerts and cause changes in the node features, but rather than track every feature for every alert-field node individually, roles provide a succinct, integrated summary of those feature changes. We measure changes in each node's probabilistic role assignment over time, and identify anomalies as deviations from expected roles. We test our approach using simulations including three weeks of normal background traffic, as well as cyber attacks that occur near the end of the simulations. This paper presents a novel approach to multi-modal data fusion and a novel application of role dynamics within the cyber-security domain. Our results show a drastic decrease in the false-positive rate when considering our anomaly indicator instead of the IDS alerts themselves, thereby reducing alarm fatigue and providing a promising avenue for threat intelligence in network defense.