More is Better : On the Backdoor Attacks in Federated Graph Neural Networks

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are a class of deep learning-based methods for processing graph domain information. GNNs have recently become a widely used graph analysis method due to their superior ability to learn representations for complex graph data. However, due to privacy concerns and regulation restrictions, centralized GNNs can be difficult to apply to data-sensitive scenarios. Federated learning (FL) is an emerging technology developed for privacy-preserving settings when several parties need to train a shared global model collaboratively. Although many research works have applied FL to train GNNs (Federated GNNs), there is no research on their robustness to backdoor attacks. This paper bridges this gap by conducting two types of backdoor attacks in Federated GNNs: centralized backdoor attacks (CBA) and distributed backdoor attacks (DBA). CBA is conducted by embedding the same global trigger during training for every malicious party, while DBA is conducted by decomposing a global trigger into separate local triggers and embedding them into the training dataset of different malicious parties, respectively. Our experiments show that the DBA attack success rate is higher than CBA in almost all evaluated cases, while rarely, the DBA attack performance is close to CBA. For CBA, the attack success rate of all local triggers is similar to the global trigger even if the training set of the adversarial party is embedded with the global trigger. To further explore the properties of two backdoor attacks in Federated GNNs, we evaluate the attack performance for different trigger sizes, poisoning intensities, and trigger densities, with trigger density being the most influential.