This paper presents a theoretical analysis and practical approach to the moral responsibilities when developing AI systems for non-military applications that may nonetheless be used for conflict applications. We argue that AI represents a form of crossover technology that is different from previous historical examples of dual- or multi-use technology as it has a multiplicative effect across other technologies. As a result, existing analyses of ethical responsibilities around dual-use technologies do not necessarily work for AI systems. We instead argue that stakeholders involved in the AI system lifecycle are morally responsible for uses of their systems that are reasonably foreseeable. The core idea is that an agent's moral responsibility for some action is not necessarily determined by their intentions alone; we must also consider what the agent could reasonably have foreseen to be potential outcomes of their action, such as the potential use of a system in conflict even when it is not designed for that. In particular, we contend that it is reasonably foreseeable that: (1) civilian AI systems will be applied to active conflict, including conflict support activities, (2) the use of civilian AI systems in conflict will impact applications of the law of armed conflict, and (3) crossover AI technology will be applied to conflicts that fall short of armed conflict. Given these reasonably foreseeably outcomes, we present three technically feasible actions that developers of civilian AIs can take to potentially mitigate their moral responsibility: (a) establishing systematic approaches to multi-perspective capability testing, (b) integrating digital watermarking in model weight matrices, and (c) utilizing monitoring and reporting mechanisms for conflict-related AI applications.