A Cost Analysis of Generative Language Models and Influence Operations

Despite speculation that recent large language models (LLMs) are likely to be used maliciously to improve the quality or scale of influence operations, uncertainty persists regarding the economic value that LLMs offer propagandists. This research constructs a model of costs facing propagandists for content generation at scale and analyzes (1) the potential savings that LLMs could offer propagandists, (2) the potential deterrent effect of monitoring controls on API-accessible LLMs, and (3) the optimal strategy for propagandists choosing between multiple private and/or open source LLMs when conducting influence operations. Primary results suggest that LLMs need only produce usable outputs with relatively low reliability (roughly 25%) to offer cost savings to propagandists, that the potential reduction in content generation costs can be quite high (up to 70% for a highly reliable model), and that monitoring capabilities have sharply limited cost imposition effects when alternative open source models are available. In addition, these results suggest that nation-states -- even those conducting many large-scale influence operations per year -- are unlikely to benefit economically from training custom LLMs specifically for use in influence operations.

Adversarial Machine Learning and Cybersecurity: Risks, Challenges, and Legal Implications

In July 2022, the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown University and the Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance at the Stanford Cyber Policy Center convened a workshop of experts to examine the relationship between vulnerabilities in artificial intelligence systems and more traditional types of software vulnerabilities. Topics discussed included the extent to which AI vulnerabilities can be handled under standard cybersecurity processes, the barriers currently preventing the accurate sharing of information about AI vulnerabilities, legal issues associated with adversarial attacks on AI systems, and potential areas where government support could improve AI vulnerability management and mitigation. This report is meant to accomplish two things. First, it provides a high-level discussion of AI vulnerabilities, including the ways in which they are disanalogous to other types of vulnerabilities, and the current state of affairs regarding information sharing and legal oversight of AI vulnerabilities. Second, it attempts to articulate broad recommendations as endorsed by the majority of participants at the workshop.