Abstract:Additive manufacturing (AM) is rapidly integrating into critical sectors such as aerospace, automotive, and healthcare. However, this cyber-physical convergence introduces new attack surfaces, especially at the interface between computer-aided design (CAD) and machine execution layers. In this work, we investigate targeted cyberattacks on two widely used fused deposition modeling (FDM) systems, Creality's flagship model K1 Max, and Ender 3. Our threat model is a multi-layered Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) intrusion, where the adversary intercepts and manipulates G-code files during upload from the user interface to the printer firmware. The MitM intrusion chain enables several stealthy sabotage scenarios. These attacks remain undetectable by conventional slicer software or runtime interfaces, resulting in structurally defective yet externally plausible printed parts. To counter these stealthy threats, we propose an unsupervised Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that analyzes structured machine logs generated during live printing. Our defense mechanism uses a frozen Transformer-based encoder (a BERT variant) to extract semantic representations of system behavior, followed by a contrastively trained projection head that learns anomaly-sensitive embeddings. Later, a clustering-based approach and a self-attention autoencoder are used for classification. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach effectively distinguishes between benign and compromised executions.
Abstract:Anomaly-based cyber threat detection using deep learning is on a constant growth in popularity for novel cyber-attack detection and forensics. A robust, efficient, and real-time threat detector in a large-scale operational enterprise network requires high accuracy, high fidelity, and a high throughput model to detect malicious activities. Traditional anomaly-based detection models, however, suffer from high computational overhead and low detection accuracy, making them unsuitable for real-time threat detection. In this work, we propose LogSHIELD, a highly effective graph-based anomaly detection model in host data. We present a real-time threat detection approach using frequency-domain analysis of provenance graphs. To demonstrate the significance of graph-based frequency analysis we proposed two approaches. Approach-I uses a Graph Neural Network (GNN) LogGNN and approach-II performs frequency domain analysis on graph node samples for graph embedding. Both approaches use a statistical clustering algorithm for anomaly detection. The proposed models are evaluated using a large host log dataset consisting of 774M benign logs and 375K malware logs. LogSHIELD explores the provenance graph to extract contextual and causal relationships among logs, exposing abnormal activities. It can detect stealthy and sophisticated attacks with over 98% average AUC and F1 scores. It significantly improves throughput, achieves an average detection latency of 0.13 seconds, and outperforms state-of-the-art models in detection time.